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CRIMINAL LAW 
UNITED STATES v. ALVARADO: 
REFLECTIONS ON A JEWELL 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Alvarado,! the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed 
that the use of a Jewell2 instruction on conscious ignorance is 
properly given only when the defendant claims a lack of guilty 
knowledge and the proof at trial supports an inference of delib-
erate ignorance.3 The Ninth Circuit found that the district court 
erred by giving the instruction because the facts tended to es-
tablish actual knowledge by the defendants.· Nonetheless, the 
convictions were affirmed because the court held that the error 
was harmless. II 
While disapproving use of the Jewell instruction in Alva-
rado,S the Ninth Circuit renewed its approval of the instruction 
1. 838 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.) (per Anderson, J.; the other panel members were Wiggins, 
J., and Canby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2880 
(1988). 
2. The designation derives from United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.) (en 
bane) (the statutory requirement of "knowingly" is satisfied if the defendant is aware 
that the fact in question is highly probable, but he consciously avoids learning the truth), 
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). The argument that such an instruction relieves the 
jury from finding knowledge by the defendant was rejected in United States v. Olivares-
Vega, 495 F.2d 827, 830 (2nd Cir. 1974) (jury properly charged that, if, in order to assert 
ignorance, the defendant deliberately chose not to learn the fact in question, the jury 
could find full equivalent of knowledge). 
3. Alvarado, 838 F.2d at 314. 
4.Id. 
5. Id. at 317. The court also considered defendants' assertions that the prosecutor 
made false representations that warranted a new trial. The court found that since the 
trial judge acted quickly, emphatically, and appropriately to neutralize the prejudicial 
effects of the statements, those statements were harmless error. Id. 
6. Alvarado, 838 F.2d at 314. 
47 
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and of the underlying concept.7 That is, to act "knowingly" is 
not strictly limited to acting with positive knowledge, but may 
also include acting with an awareness of the high probability of 
the existence of the fact in question. When such an awareness 
exists, "positive" knowledge is not required.8 Although the Su-
preme Court has yet to rule on such an instruction,9 Judge (now 
Justice) Kennedy, dissenting in Jewell, noted that there is a 
problem in viewing wilful blindness as distinct from, but equally 
culpable as, "actual" knowledge.1o 
Ninth Circuit cases employing the conscious ignorance in-
struction have frequently involved incidents of illegal contra-
band,l1 but the instruction has also been given in criminal prose-
cutions of a broader range.12 The purpose of the instruction is to 
7.Id. 
8. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700. "One with a deliberate anti·social purpose in mind ... 
may deliberately 'shut his eyes' to avoid knowing what would otherwise be obvious to 
view. In such cases, so far as criminal law is concerned, the person acts at his peril in this 
regard, and is treated as having 'knowledge' of the facts as they are ultimately discovered 
to be." Id. at 700·01 (quoting R. PERKINS. CRIMINAL LAW 776 (2d ed. 1969». 
9. Id. at 701·03. However, the Supreme Court has applied the Model Penal Code 
definition of knowledge in determining the meaning of "knowing" in former 21 U.S.C. § 
176a. Id. at 701 (citing Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 n.93, (1969) (impermissible 
to presume that a possessor of marijuana "knows" of its illegal importation). Again, in 
Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416 & n.29, (1970) (those who sell or distribute 
heroin are undoubtedly aware of the high probability that the heroin originated in a 
foreign country and jury is permitted to infer that heroin possessed here is a smuggled 
drug), the Court adopted the Model Penal Code definition of ~'knowingly". The Jewell 
court noted that Congress "is presumed to have known and adopted the 'cluster of ideas' 
attached to such a familiar term of art". Jewell, 532 F.2d at 703 (citing Morissette v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (omission from U.S.C. § 641 of any mention of intent 
is not to be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes defined». 
10. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy observed that 
Section 2.02(7) of the Model Penal Code is a definition of knowledge, not a substitute for 
it. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 104·105. 
11. United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 
1985) (violation of Toxic Substances Control Act, §§ 2·30, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601·2609) (cit· 
ing United States v. Lopez·Martinez, 725 F.2d 471, 474·75 (9th Cir.) (importation and 
possession of heroin with intent to distribute), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984); United 
States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645, 649·52 (9th Cir. 1982) (importation of heroin and 
possession with intent to distribute); United States v. Nicholson, 677 F.2d 706, 710·11 
(9th Cir. 1982) (conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute); United States 
v. Erwin, 625 F.2d 838, 841 (9th Cir. 1980) (importation of heroin». 
12. Pacific Hide, 768 F.2d at 1098 (citing United States v. Henderson, 721 F.2d 276, 
277·79 (9th Cir. 1983), (theft of timber belonging to the United States); United States v. 
Long, 706 F.2d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 1983) (theft of meat from military installation); 
United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 786·87 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (securities 
fraud in the context of false financial statements). cert. denied. 439 U.S. 981 (1978); 
United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1074·75 (9th Cir. 1977) (concealment of escaped 
2
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prevent individuals from circumventing criminal sanctions 
merely by deliberately closing their eyes to an obvious risk of 
unlawful conduct. IS This does not create a new crime, but rather 
forecloses a potential "loophole" in the law.14 
Because the instruction seems to lend itself particularly to 
those cases involving illegal contraband, II! the conscious igno-
rance doctrine and Jewell instruction have become increasingly 
important as the federal government expands the prosecution of 
cases involving smuggled drugs. There is evidence that "deliber-
ate avoidance" is an established practice in the illegal drug busi-
ness. 16 Absent the instruction, individuals who participate in 
such ventures could escape liability by the "simple expedient of 
not asking questions".17 
Despite its importance as a prosecutorial tool, the useful-
ness of the instruction is impaired by occasional inappropriate 
use and confusion generated by disparate forms of the instruc-
tion in the federal courts. 
II. FACTS 
On July 22, 1986, Gustavo Alvarado (Alvarado) and Oscar 
Oqueli-Hernandez (Oqueli) arrived at the Los Angeles Airport 
on a flight from Brazil.18 They were accompanied by Oqueli's 
federal prisoner), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978)). 
13. United States v. Sarrantos, 455 F.2d 877, 881 (2nd Cir. 1972) (conspiracy to 
make false statements to the Immigration and Naturalization Service). The decision in 
Sarrantos predates Jewell, but anticipates the reasoning in Jewell. [d. (citing Leary v. 
United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 n.93 (1969)). 
14. Sarrantos, 455 F.2d at 881. 
15. Pacific Hide, 768 F.2d at 1098 (citing United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 725 F.2d 
471,474-75 (9th Cir.) (importation and possession of heroin with intent to distribute), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984); United States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645, 649-52 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (importation and possession of heroin with intent to distribute); United States 
v. Nicholson, 677 F.2d 706, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1982) (conspiracy to import and possess 
marijuana with intent to distribute)). 
16. Nicholson, 677 F.2d at 711. 
17. The defendant in Nicholson loaned $20,000 to two individuals who promised 
him at least an eight-to-one return on his investment. Although the defendant knew that 
the men had been in the marijuana smuggling business, he testified that he did not ask 
how his $20,000 was to be used. Several co-conspirators testified that this was a common 
practice in the drug business. The testimony was to the effect that one does not ask 
questions, because one does not want to know the answer. [d. at 708. 
18. United States v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 
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son, Yuri, and Roberto Katan (Katan).19 Oqueli picked up suit-
cases belonging to Alvarado and Yuri, then, using an expired 
diplomatic passport,20 cleared customs without a check. Alva-
rado picked up a brown suitcase and a black suitcase, both be-
longing to Oqueli and proceeded to the customs station.21 The 
customs agent noticed that Alvarado's hands trembled as he 
handed her the flight ticket and other travel documents.22 
Among the documents was an unused Japan Airlines ticket 
dated three days earlier. Alvarado then voluntarily identified 
himself as a doctor.2s Because the customs agent found his be-
havior suspicious, he was directed to the secondary inspection 
station for further examination.2' 
When asked to open the black suitcase, Alvarado explained 
that Oqueli had the key.26 A customs agent escorted Alvarado to 
an exit where a set of keys were produced, not by Oqueli, but by 
Katan.26 In an attempt to open the black suitcase, Alvarado 
fumbled and then dropped the keys. Next, he explained that the 
keys belonged to the brown suitcase.27 Alvarado voluntarily 
opened the brown suitcase, but it contained only clothing and 
dental equipment.28 Alvarado then told the agent that his friend 
had the keys to the black suitcase, but by that time, Oqueli, his 
son, and Katan had left the airport and could not be located.29 
With consent from Alvarado, the black suitcase was opened with 
a crowbar and Alvarado immediately turned pale. A search of 
the contents revealed eleven packages of cocaine.30 
2880 (1988). 
19. [d. 
20. [d. Oqueli held the position of General Consul for Honduras from January, 1984 
to January, 1985. The diplomatic pass had expired with the termination of his post, but 
the customs agent was unaware that the pass was invalid. [d. 
21. [d. The customs agent noted that Alvarado was well-dressed, yet he was carrying 
a red gym-type zipper bag. [d. 
22. [d. 
23. [d. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. Oscar Oqueli was standing by an exit with his son and Katan. [d. 
26. [d. 
27. [d. 
28. [d. 
29. [d. When Alvarado was asked why he didn't get the keys to the black suitcase 
the first time, he stated that he had forgotten to ask for them. [d. 
30. [d. Although Alvarado agreed to open the black suitcase with a crowbar, he ex-
plained that the suitcase was not his and stated that he was not responsible for its con-
tents. [d. 
4
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Following his arrest, and through an interpreter, Alvarado 
told a representative of the Drug Enforcement Agency that 
Oqueli owned the black suitcase and that Alvarado did not know 
about the cocaine.31 The interpreter subsequently testified that 
Alvarado told him that Oqueli offered Alvarado a $5000 gift if 
Alvarado would carry his suitcase.32 Alvarado's testimony at trial 
denied any discussion of payment for carrying the suitcase.33 
Cooperating with DEA agents, Alvarado placed telephone 
callsa4 to Oqueli which eventually led to a meeting at the airport 
where Oqueli and Katan were arrested. 311 Following his arrest, 
Oqueli stated that the black suitcase belonged to him, that he 
had lent it to Alvarado in Rio de Janeiro, and that he was una-
ware of the cocaine in the suitcase.36 
Alv~rado and Oqueli were tried together for importing, con-
spiring to import, and possessing with intent to distribute 12.7 
kilograms of cocaine.37 After two days of deliberation, the jury 
requested the court to clarify the meaning of the statute. Specif-
ically, the jury asked about the relationship between the words 
"know" and "iI'l:tent" and the word "cocaine".38 The judge re-
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 313. The $5000 was to be paid to Alvarado when he returned to the 
United States. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. Alvarado first placed a call to Oqueli and left the message that Oqueli should 
come to the Marriot Hotel to pick up Alvarado and the suitcases. Id. Some hours later, 
Oqueli's sister arrived and without other conversation, asked for change to make a phone 
call. Alvarado gave her the change, the call was made, and she left. Id. Alvarado then 
made a second call to Oqueli and arranged a meeting at the airport. Id. 
35. Id. Oqueli and Katan arrived at the airport in a taxi which passed by Alvarado, 
who waved as it passed, but received no acknowledgement. Id. Oqueli then exited the 
cab a short distance from Alvarado, motioning for Alvarado to remain there while Oqueli 
walked to a phone booth and placed a call. Id. A telephone in the telephone bank near 
Alvarado began to ring, but Alvarado ignored it. Id. Oqueli hung up the phone and 
walked quickly toward Alvarado, picked up both suitcases, and walked away hurriedly. 
Id. He resisted attempts by DEA agents to stop him. Id. 
36. Id. In addition, he stated that he was, among other things, in the import-export 
business in the United States. Id. 
37. Id. Defendants were indicted with the commission of three felony offenses. 
Count I alleged the crime of conspiracy to import a controlled substance (21 U.S.C., §§ 
963, 952(a)(1). Count II alleged the crime of importing 12.7 kilograms of cocaine from 
Brazil into the United States (21 U.S.C., §§ 952(a), 960 (a)(l». Count III alleged the 
crime of possession with intent to distribute 12.7 kilograms of cocaine (21 U.S.C., § 
841(a)(1». Brief for Appellant at 2, United States u. Oqueli-Hernandez, 838 F.2d 311 
(9th Cir. 1988) (No. 85-5280). 
38.Id. 
5
Chesnut: Criminal Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1989
52 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:47 
read his instructions on "knowledge" and "intent" and then 
gave a Jewell instruction.39 Objection by both defense counsel 
was denied. After deliberating another thirty minutes, the jury 
returned a verdict against both defendants on all three counts in 
the indictment. '0 
Defense counsel moved for a new trial on grounds, inter 
alia, that there was no evidence to justify a Jewell instruction, 
and that the Jewell instruction, as given, was deficient.H 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. DEVELOPMENT 
The instruction for conscious avoidance of the truth 
originated in the 1976 Ninth Circuit case of United States v. 
Jewell.'2 In Jewell, the defendant accepted $100 from an indi-
vidual to drive a car across the border from Mexico after previ-
39. [d. at 313-14. The instruction given was as follows: 
Id. at 314. 
40. [d. 
Now, the instruction which I originally refused but I'm 
going to give you now is this: The element of knowledge. It's 
Devitt and Blackmar's Volume 1, Section 14.09. 
The element of knowledge may be satisfied by inferences 
drawn from proof that a defendant deliberately-notice I say 
"deliberately"-closed his eyes to what would otherwise have 
been obvious to him. A finding beyond a reasonable doubt of a 
conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment would permit an in-
ference of knowledge. 
Stated another way: A defendant's knowledge of a fact 
may be inferred from willful blindness to the existence of a 
fact. It's entirely up to you as to whether you find any deliber-
ate closing of the eyes and the inference to be drawn from any 
such evidence. A showing of negligence or mistake alone is not 
sufficient to show a finding of willfulness or knowledge. 
If you find a defendant who you are considering believed what 
was in the boxes was not a controlled substance, then you 
must acquit. 
41. [d. See supra note 39. Because the court found that the Jewell instruction was 
given in error, the issue of the sufficiency of the instruction was not considered. [d. at 
317. See also infra text accompanying note 172. 
42. 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). The court in 
United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361 (3rd Cir. 1985) (knowingly importing and pos-
sessing cocaine with intent to distribute) traced the origins of the instruction to the Jew-
ell decision, but (perhaps due to editing errors?) the Fifth Circuit is given credit. [d. at 
365. 
6
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ously declining an offer to buy marijuana from him.43 When a 
search of the automobile revealed 110 pounds of marijuana, the 
defendant claimed he did not know the marijuana was in the 
car." The Ninth Circuit approved a jury instruction which al-
lowed satisfaction of the statutory requirement of knowledge if 
the defendant's ignorance was solely and entirely the result of 
his conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.411 
The legal premise underlying the Jewell instruction has its 
roots in English law.46 Although relatively new to U.S. courts,47 
the instruction has achieved firm support among American com-
mentators.48 Those authorities have long recognized that the 
statutory requirement of actual knowledge has one strictly lim-
ited exception: A person is deemed to have knowledge if his sus-
picion is aroused, but deliberately avoids knowing the truth in 
order to remain ignorant.49 The concept has been adopted under 
such various labels as wilful blindness,lIo conscious avoidance,lIl 
43. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 699 n.!. 
44. [d. at 698-99 nn. I & 2. 
45. [d. at 699-70. The court instructed the jury that "knowingly" meant voluntarily 
and intentionally and not by accident or mistake. The court then told the jury that the 
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "knowingly" 
brought the marijuana into the United States and "knowingly" possessed the marijuana. 
[d. The court continued: 
[d. 
The Government can complete their burden of proof by 
proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that if the defendant was 
not actually aware that there was marijuana in the vehicle he 
was driving when he entered the United States his ignorance 
in that regard was solely and entirely a result of his having 
made a conscious purpose to disregard the nature of that 
which was in the vehicle, with a conscious purpose to avoid 
learning the truth. 
46. [d. The English courts have described it as "connivance", "constructive knowl-
edge", or "knowledge of the second degree". Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowl-
edge, 17 MODERN L. REv. 294, 298 (1954). "A classic illustration of this doctrine is the 
connivance of an innkeeper who deliberately arranges not to go into his back room and 
thus avoids visual confirmation of the gambling he believes is taking place." Jewell, 532 
F.2d at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Bosley v. Davies, (1875) L.R. 1 Q.B. 84). 
47. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Judge Kennedy observed that 
the majority opinion justifies the conscious purpose instruction as an application of the 
wilful blindness doctrine recognized primarily by English authorities. [d. 
48. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700. 
49. [d. (quoting G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART, § 57 at 157 (2nd 
ed. 1961) (hereinafter WILLIAMS). 
50. United States v. Littlefield, 840 F.2d 143, 147 (1st Cir.) (scheme to defraud the 
United States by filing false claims for unemployment benefits), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 
155 (1988); United States v. Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244, 248 (10th Cir. 1987) (possession of 
7
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deliberate ignorance,1I2 and connivance.1I3 
Judge Browning, writing the opinion of the court in Jewell, 
refered to the history of the concept and offered as substantive 
justification the rationale that deliberate ignorance and positive 
knowledge are equally culpable.1I4 Further justification was 
found in the common understanding that one may "know" that 
of which he has less than absolute understanding.1I11 
marijuana with intent to distribute, interstate travel in aid of racketeering, and aiding 
and abetting); United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676, 682 (1st Cir. 1987) (mail fraud), 
cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1080 (1988); United States v. Krowen, 809 F.2d 144, 148 (1st Cir. 
1987) (scheme to defraud insurance companies); Caminos, 770 F.2d at 366 (3rd Cir. 
1985); United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir. 
1985). 
51. United States v. Gatzonis, 805 F.2d 72, 73 (2nd Cir. 1986) (possession of heroin 
with intent to distribute), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 303 (1987); United States v. Picciandra, 
788 F.2d 39, 46 (lst Cir.) (income tax evasion), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 847 (1986); United 
States v. Aleman, 728 F.2d 492, 493-94 (11th Cir. 1985) (importation of cocaine and pos-
session with intent to distribute a controlled substance); United States v. McAllister, 747 
F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1984) (transportation of illegal aliens), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 
829 (1985); United States v. Garzon, 688 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir. 1982) (possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute). 
52. Littlefield, 840 F.2d at 147; United States v. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024, 1028 (11th 
Cir.) (conspiracy to possess, and actual possession of, marijuana and cocaine with intent 
to distribute), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 155 (1988); United States v. Kelm, 827 F.2d 1319, 
1323-24 (9th Cir. 1987) (willful failure to file federal income tax returns); Pacific Hide, 
768 F.2d at 1098, McAllister, 747 F.2d at 1275. 
53. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 701. The early English cases demonstrated a preference for 
this term because of its broad implications. One such case states: 
The word "conniving" is not to be limited to the literal 
meaning of wilfully refusing to see, or affecting not to see or 
become acquainted with, that which you know or believe is 
happening, or about to happen. It must include the case of a 
husband acquiescing in, by wilfully abstaining from taking any 
steps to prevent, that adulterous intercourse which, from what 
passes before his eyes, he cannot but believe or reasonably 
suspect is likely to occur." 
Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge, 17 MOD. L. REV. 294, 298 (1954) (quoting 
Gipps v. Gipps and Hume, 11 H.S.C. 1 (1864». 
54. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700. 
55. [d. The court continued saying that to act "knowingly", therefore, is not neces-
sarily to act only with positive knowledge, but also to act with an awareness of the high 
probability of the existence of the fact in question. When such awareness is present, 
"positive" knowledge is not required. [d. 
However, the court emphasized that the required state of mind differs from positive 
knowledge only so far as necessary to encompass a deliberate effort to avoid the sanc-
tions of a statute while violating its substance. [d. at 704. "A court can properly find 
wilful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant actually knew." [d. 
(quoting from WILLIAMS, supra note 49, § 57 at 159). 
8
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The Ninth Circuit's recognition of a form of knowledge 
other than actual knowledge was not noveP6 Rather, the court's 
decision in Jewell was notable for its articulation of the circum-
stances under which a conscious purpose to avoid discovering 
the truth could be equated with knowledge.07 In a footnote re-
view of the application of such an instruction by courts in other 
circuits, the Jewell opinion documented a variety of results and 
some inherent confusion.1I8 Anticipating such difficulties, the 
Ninth Circuit offered guidance for jury instructions with section 
2.02(7) of the Model Penal Code in mind.1I9 The Supreme Court 
has given at least tacit approval to the definition of knowledge 
in that section,60 and recent federal appellate decisions have in-
56. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700. 
57. United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 1977) (possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute). 
58. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 702 n.12. Among the problems noted by the court were omis-
sions in the instructions, United States v. Squires, 440 F.2d 859. 864 & n. 12 (2nd Cir. 
1971) (knowingly making false statement in connection with acquisition of a firearm; 
Model Penal Code followed and jury instruction rejected because it should have included 
"deliberate ignorance"); United States v. Llanes, 374 F.2d 712, 716 (2nd Cir.) (receiving, 
concealing and facilitating the transportation of illegally imported heroin; instructions 
properly refused since they failed to include the element of "a conscious purpose to 
avoid learning the" [fact in question]), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 917 (1967); Griego v. 
United States, 298 F.2d 845, 849 (10th Cir. 1962) (concealment and sale of unlawfully 
imported drugs; conviction reversed because jury should have been given deliberate igno-
rance instruction); United States v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584, 586-88 (2nd Cir. 1975) (posses-
sion of stolen mail; conviction reversed because trial court refused to add to a deliberate 
ignorance instruction the qualification "unless he actually believes it did not exist"). 
Jewell, 532 F.2d at 702 n.12. Professor Glanville Williams alluded to the difficulties in-
herent in the doctrine when he wrote, "The rule that wilful blindness is equivalent to 
knowledge is essential, and is found throughout the criminal law. It is, at the same time, 
an unstable rule, because judges are apt to forget its very limited scope." [d. at 700 
(quoting WILLIAMS. supra note 49, § 57 at 159). 
59. [d. at 704. The court said: 
We do not suggest that the instruction give'"n in this case 
was a model in all respects. The jury should have been in-
structed more directly (1) that the required knowledge is es-
tablished if the accused is aware of a high probability of the 
existence of the fact in question, (2) unless he actually believes 
it does not exist. 
[d. n.21. Section 2.02(7) of the Model Penal Code states: 
"When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such 
knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless 
he actually believes that it does not exist." MODEL PENAL CODE 27 (Prop. Official Draft 
1962). The court observed that the negation "unless he actually believes that it does not 
exist" was not raised as an issue at the trial level in Jewell, speculating that perhaps the 
evidence to support it was lacking. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 702 n.12. 
60. See supra note 9. 
9
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dicated a general acceptance.S1 
Embracing the doctrine in Jewell, the Courts of Appeals in 
all of the circuits have either expressed acceptance of the doc-
trine or adopted some form of deliberate ignorance instruction.s2 
As early as 1962, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. GriegoS8 
held that the tendered defense of no knowledge is not available 
if the jury finds from all the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant had a conscious purpose to avoid learning 
the fact in question.s• In the 1970 case of United States v. 
Abrams,slI the Second Circuit employed the concept of conscious 
ignorance.ss The Jewell court noted that such instructions were 
also approved in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.s7 Further, 
Courts of Appeals in other circuits had approved the premise 
that "knowingly" in criminal statutes is not limited to positive 
61. See United States v. Feroz, 848 F.2d 359, 360 (2nd Cir. 1988) (importation and 
possession with intent to distribute heroin); United States v. Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244, 249 
(10th Cir. 1987) (possession of marijuana with intent to distribute); United States v. 
Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1021 (2nd Cir.) (conspiracy to commit wire fraud), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 861 (1986); Caminos, 770 F.2d at 365-66. 
62. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 702. See also infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text. 
63. 298 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1962) (receipt, concealment and sale of unlawfully im-
ported drugs). 
64. [d. at 849. 
65. 427 F.2d 86 (2nd Cir.) (false statements to the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, endeavoring to influence a witness, and causing an alien to fail to carry and have 
in possession a certificate of alien registration), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970). 
66. [d. at 91. The court found sufficient evidence from which the jury could have 
found that the appellant acted with "reckless disregard of whether the statements were 
true and with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth". [d. (emphasis added). At 
the time Jewell was decided the Second Circuit already had substantial case law in sup-
port of the doctrine. Jewell, 523 F.2d at 702 n.12. See generally United States v. Dozier, 
522 F.2d 224 (2nd Cir.) (aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1021 (1975); United States v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584 (2nd 
Cir. 1975); United States v. Olivares-Vega, 495 F.2d 827 (2nd Cir.) (importation of co-
caine and possession with intent to distribute), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974); 
United States v. Joly, 493 F.2d 672 (2nd Cir. 1974) (importation and illegal production of 
cocaine); United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270 (2nd Cir.) (crimes relating to dealing in 
stolen United States Treasury bills), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); United States v. 
Sarrantos, 455 F.2d 877 (2nd Cir. 1972); Squires, 440 F.2d at 859. 
67. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 702. See United States v. Thomas, 484 F.2d 909, 912-13 (6th 
Cir.) (making false statements to licensed firearm dealer to purchase handgun and re-
ceipt and possession of a gun by one dishonorably discharged from the Army), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 912 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 924 (1974); United States v. Joyce, 499 
F.2d 9, 23 (7th Cir.) (mail fraud), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031 (1974); United States v. 
Grizaffi, 471 F.2d 69, 75 (7th Cir. 1972) (conspiracy to misapply federally insured savings 
and loan funds, concealment of material facts and false statements to the government, 
mail fraud), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 964 (1973). 
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knowledge, but includes the state of mind of one who lacks 
knowledge soley due to deliberate ignorance.ss Since the Jewell 
decision, conscious ignorance instructions have been approved in 
the First,SS Third,70 Fourth,71 Fifth,72 Eighth,73 Tenth,74 and 
Eleventh7l! Circuits. 
68. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 702 and n.13. See Abrams, 427 F.2d at 91; United States v. 
Cooperative Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47, 59 (8th Cir. 1973) (violations of the False 
Claims Act). 
69. See United States v. Littlefield, 840 F.2d 143, 147-48 (1st Cir.) (wilful blindness 
instruction established as law, but instruction given in error), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 155 
(1988); United States v. Krowen, 809 F.2d 144, 148-49 (1st Cir. 1987) (wilful blindness 
instruction affirmed); United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676, 682-83 (1st Cir. 1987) (in-
struction equating wilful blindness with knowledge approved); United States v. Piccian-
dra, 788 F.2d 39, 46 (1st. Cir.) (testimony at trial justified conscious avoidance instruc-
tion), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 847 (1986); United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 243-44 
(1st Cir.) (false claims against the United States in a conspiracy to defraud; approval of 
conscious avoidance charge and approval of doctrine), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982). 
70. See United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365-66 (3rd Cir. 1985) (deliberate 
ignorance instruction affirmed as proper interpretation of law). 
71. See United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 181 (4th Cir. 1985) (deliberate igno-
rance instruction affirmed as proper interpretation of law). 
72. See United States v. de Luna, 815 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1987) (possession of mari-
juana with intent to distribute; conscious ignorance instruction affirmed); United States 
v. Batencort, 592 F.2d 916, 917-18 (5th Cir. 1979) (importation of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute; deliberate ignorance recognized as equivalent of knowledge); 
United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 528-29 (5th Cir.) (unlawful importation 
of cocaine, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, unlawful use of a passport and 
visa issued to another person; deliberate ignorance instruction approved), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 935 (1978). 
73. See United States v. White, 794 F.2d 367,371 (8th Cir. 1986) (conspiracy to steal 
and possess stolen mail; instruction upheld in principle, but given in error). 
74. See United States v. Markopoulos, 848 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1988) (conspiracy to 
distribute marijuana; instruction on deliberate closing of eyes given in error, but did not 
require reversa!); United States v. Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244, 248-50 (10th Cir. 1987) (posses-
sion of marijuana with intent to distribute; instruction on wilful blindness affirmed); 
United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1983) (mail fraud; deliberate ignorance 
instruction affirmed), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984). 
75. See United States v. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024, 1028 (11th Cir.) (conspiracy to pos-
sess, and possession of marijuana and cocaine with intent to distribute; deliberate igno-
rance instruction affirmed), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2003 (1988); United States v. Orr, 825 
F.2d 1537, 1541-42 (11th Cir. 1987) (conspiracy to violate and substantive violations of 
the Dyer Act; deliberate ignorance instruction properly given); United States v. Peddle, 
821 F.2d 1521, 1524-25 (11th Cir. 1987) (conspiracy to import and possess cocaine with 
intent to distribute, importation and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute; con-
scious avoidance instruction properly given); United States v. Aleman, 728 F.2d 492, 493-
94 (11th Cir. 1984) (importation of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute a 
controlled substance; instruction on conscious avoidance affirmed). 
11
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B. ApPROPRIATE CONTEXT 
Judge Kennedy, dissenting in part in United States v. Mur-
rieta-Bejarano,76 urged that the instruction is appropriate only 
when the evidence supports a finding, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning 
the truth.77 In United States v. Suttiswad,78 the Ninth Circuit 
found that such evidence was shown. The defendant in Suttis-
wad arrived in the United States on a flight from Tokyo and was 
one of the last passengers to retrieve his luggage.79 Following 
questioning by customs Agents,80 a search was made of defend-
ant's person and luggage.81 When the linings of the suitcase were 
removed, eight packages of heroin (valued at $5,000,000) were 
discovered.82 Following his arrest, the defendant denied all 
knowledge of the heroin.8s He told the customs agent that an 
American, "Mr. Tom",84 gave him the suitcase811 and was to have 
met him at the Los Angeles Airport.86 No identifiable finger-
76. 552 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1977) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
77. Id. at 1326. To permit the instruction when the facts do not support such an 
inference of conscious avoidance "is to permit it in any number of smuggling cases." Id. 
The danger is that juries will disregard the element of scienter and convict under stan-
dards analogous to negligence. Id. See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
78. 696 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1982). 
79. Id. at 646. 
80. After looking at the Customs agent several times, the defendant claimed a suit-
case and carried it to Customs, where it was briefly inspected and returned. Id. In re-
sponse to questioning by the agent, defendant stated that he was in the hotel business, 
specifically "most like a clerk". Id. His passport listed his profession as "Merchant". Id. 
81. Id. The search of the defendant revealed $1,500.00 in traveler's checks, a pass-
port, an airliine ticket and some cash. 
82. The suitcase was thoroughly searched after one of the agents noticed that its lid 
"seemed rather heavy for an empty suitcase." Id. 
83. The defendant stated that he had been hired in Bangkok to act as taxi driver for 
an American, by the name of Mr. Tom. Id. Subsequently, the two became friends and 
Tom had asked the defendant if he would like to go to the United States. The defendant 
(Mr. Suttiswad) said he was poor and unable to travel to the United States. Id. Tom said 
he would buy him a ticket, and give him new clothing, cash, and a suitcase. Mr. Suttis-
wad agreed and the arrangements were made. Id. 
84. The defendant was unable to identify the American, recalling only that that he 
was a forty-year-old white male with blondish hair and rather skinny. Suttiswad, 696 
F.2d at 647. 
85. Id. Mr. Suttiswad said that Mr. Tom gave him ten thousand baht (Thai cur-
rency) to be used for travel arrangements and to pay for a passport. Id. Suttiswad also 
said that later the American gave him cash to purchase the ticket and an additional 
amount for spending cash. Id. The suitcase carried by the defendant was perfumed and 
exceptionally heavy. Id. at 651 and n.5. 
86. Id. at 647. Although defendant had missed a plane connection in Tokyo and 
12
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prints were found on the plastic bags containing the heroin and 
the defendant presented no evidence at trial.87 
In United States v. Feroz,88 the Second Circuit affirmed the 
instruction when the facts at trial presented a pattern similar to 
those in Suttiswad. In Feroz, the defendant arrived in the 
United States on a flight from London.89 He was carrying an at-
tache case concealing 971.56 grams of heroin in a secret com-
partment.90 Feroz testified that a man named Mirahmad, whom 
he had met in Afghanistan, had offered to help him immigrate 
from India to the United States.91 Two hours before Feroz was 
to fly from Delhi to London, Mirahmad presented the defendant 
with a false passport, a plane ticket and the attache case, which 
appeared to be empty.92 At trial, Feroz claimed no knowledge of 
the heroin in the attache case.93 
Ninth Circuit cases decided after Jewell have consistently 
held that a Jewell instruction is properly given to a jury only 
when the defendant claims a lack of guilty knowledge and the 
proof at trial supports an inference of deliberate ignorance.94 
been delayed overnight, the defendant told the customs agent that Tom "would ... 
know". [d. Defendant later indicated that he was supposed to contact Mr. Tom at the 
Cloud Motel in Los Angeles. [d. A telephone number for the Cloud Motel was listed in 
an address book carried by the defendant. [d. At the time of his arrest, defendant had in 
his possession a letter from a tour company in Bangkok addressed to a tour company in 
California advising them that Suttiswad would be joining an in-progress tour. [d. Suttis-
wad did not volunteer this information to the customs agent, and the California tour 
director was unaware of any information regarding the defendant. [d. 
87. [d. The court found that if the "Mr. Tom" story was true, the circumstances 
surrounding his trip to the United States sufficiently pointed to deliberate ignorance and 
therefore justified the instruction. [d. at 651. See also infra note 167 and accompanying 
text. 
88. 848 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1988). 
89. [d. at 359. 
90. [d. Feroz was arrested and charged with "knowingly and intentionally" import-
ing heroin with "knowingly and intentionally" possessing with intent to distribute. [d. 
The defendant was carrying a passport in the name of Mirahmad Feroz, but stated that 
his real name was Mohammed Ishaq Feroz. [d. 
91. [d. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. 
94. United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 
1985) (citing United States v. McAllister, 747 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 829 (1985); United States v. Henderson, 721 F.2d 276, 277 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(theft of federally owned timber); United States v. Garzon, 688 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir. 
1982); United States v. Murrieta-Bejarano, 552 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 1977». See also 
United States v. Erwin, 625 F.2d 838, 841 (9th Cir. 1980) (illegal importation of heroin). 
13
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The cases in which the facts justify such an inference are rare.911 
Therefore, the instruction should rarely be given.98 Nevertheless, 
in the Ninth Circuit, with some frequency, the instruction has 
been given in situations where the facts do not support an infer-
ence of conscious ignorance, as in Alvarado.9? On occasion, this 
problem has arisen in other circuits.98 
Federal Courts of Appeal have allowed the instruction when 
there is some evidence of both actual knowledge and conscious 
avoidance99 and have tended to find harmless error when the ev-
idence leans heavily toward actual knowledge. loo The instruction 
95. McAllister, 747 F.2d at 1275 (citing United States v. Murrieta-Bejarano, 552 
F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 1977». 
96. Murrieta, 552 F.2d at 1325. 
97. 838 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2880 (1988). See infra notes 144-
152 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Keirn, 827 F.2d 1319, 1323-24 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (conscious avoidance instruction improperly given, but error was harmless); 
Pacific Hide, 768 F.2d at 1097-99 (insufficient evidence of wilful blindness); United 
States v. Beckett, 724 F.2d 855, 856 (9th Cir. 1984) (no evidence that defendant tried to 
close his eyes or ears); United States v. Garzon, 688 F.2d 607, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(evidence that defendant's conduct was inconsistent with conscious avoidance). 
98. See United States v. Littlefield, 840 F.2d 143, 147-50 (1st Cir.) (insufficient evi-
dence of a conscious course of deliberate ignorance but harmless error), cert. denied, 109 
S.Ct. 155 (1988); United States v. Markopoulos, 848 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(deliberate ignorance instructions given were harmless error); United States v. White, 
794 F.2d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 1986) (facts did not support giving of conscious avoidance 
instruction but error harmless). 
99. See United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 181 (4th Cir. 1988) (evidence of ac-
tual knowledge and that defendant deliberately closed her eyes to the truth); United 
States v. Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244, 248-49 (10th Cir. 1987) (evidence supporting both actual 
knowledge and deliberate avoidance of knowledge); United States v. de Luna, 815 F.2d 
301, 302 (5th Cir. 1987) (evidence of actual knowledge and deliberate avoidance of 
knowledge by defendant); United States v. Krowen, 809 F.2d 144, 148-50 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(evidence of high probability of actual knowledge by defendant and that defendant will-
fully chose to blind himself to facts); United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 188-191 
(7th Cir.) (evidence of actual knowledge and defendants' portrayal of themselves as "gul-
lible" combined to make instruction appropriate), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986); 
United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 243-44 (1st Cir.) (evidence of actual knowledge 
and sufficient evidence that defendant chose not to know the fact in question), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982); United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 
1977) (evidence of actual knowledge and that defendant was "aware of a high probability 
of the fact in question"), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978). 
100. See Littlefield, 840 F.2d at 147 (defendant did not claim ignorance of the ille-
gal activity and facts did not suggest a course of deliberate ignorance, but willful blind-
ness instruction was harmless error); United States v. Keirn, 827 F.2d 1319, 1323-24 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (facts tended to show actual knowledge rather than deliberate ignorance so 
instruction inappropriate, but "logically harmless" to defendant); United States v. Hol-
land, 831 F.2d 717, 722-23 (7th Cir. 1987) (the inherently suspicious nature of the illegal 
activity suggested actual awareness by defendants, so "ostrich" instruction was error, but 
harmless); United States v. White, 794 F.2d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 1986) (overwhelming evi-
14
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has been disallowed when there is insufficient evidence of con-
scious avoidance. lol 
C. SEMANTICS AND FORM 
The dissent in Jewell noted that one flaw in the wilful 
blindness doctrine is its bias toward visual verification of facts to 
determine actual knowledge. l02 Knowledge may be acquired 
through multiple combinations of senses and mental deductions 
and remain validly "actual".103 Judge Kennedy further cited the 
more important legal problem posed by viewing wilful blindness 
as a state of mind distinct from "actual" knowledge. l04 That is, 
when a statute specifically requires knowledge as an element of a 
crime, the substitution of some other state of mind cannot be 
justified even if the court deems that both are equally 
blameworthy. lOll 
Finally, Judge Kennedy observed that there is difficulty in 
maintaining a clear distinction between behavior that consti-
. tutes conscious ignorance and that which is merely "reckless" 
and thus implies negligence. l06 The Second Circuit has been 
troubled by such semantics in the past,107 and the same words 
dence of direct participation by defendant in illegal activities so instruction given in er-
ror, but error harmless). 
101. See United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 
1985) (insufficient evidence of willful blindness to warrant a Jewell instruction); United 
States v. Beckett, 724 F.2d 855, 856 (9th Cir. 1984) (insufficient evidence that defendant 
tried to close his eyes or ears to what was happening); United States v. Garzon, 688 F.2d 
607,609 (9th Cir. 1982) (insufficient evidence that defendant contrived to avoid learning 
the truth). 
102. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. See also United States v. Murrieta-Bejarano, 552 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 
1977) (importation and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute). Judge Ken-
nedy, dissenting in Murrieta, warned that the danger in giving the instruction absent 
evidence of conscious ignorance is that juries will avoid questions of scienter and convict 
under the standards analogous to negligence. Such convictions are wholly inconsistent 
with the statutory requirement of scienter. Id. at 1326 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
107. See United States v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584, 586-89 (2nd Cir. 1975) (conviction 
reversed when jury instruction included "reckless disregard" and conscious effort to 
avoid learning truth, without balancing instruction). See also, United States v. Jacobs, 
475 F.2d 270, 287-288 (2nd Cir. 1973) (approval of jury instruction containing "reckless 
disregard" and conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth); United States v. Sar-
rantos, 475 F.2d 877, 880-82 (2nd Cir. 1972) ("reckless disregard" of the falsity of state-
15
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have found their way to the Sixth Circuit. lOS The distinction be-
tween terms such as and "reckless disregard" and "negligence" 
borders on nuance. lOS It follows that a jury would be confused 
when the use of such language is employed in connection with 
the instruction. 11 0 Recognizing this, the Second Circuit in 
United States v. Hanlon,lll strongly urged that the term "reck-
less" be omitted from the instruction.ll2 Adopting this policy, 
more recent Second Circuit cases have avoided the term and the 
approved instructions resemble the Ninth Circuit model.11s 
In an analysis to determine whether knowledge existed, the 
question then follows whether to use an objective, reasonable 
person test, or whether the defendant's subjective belief should 
be considered dispositive. 1 a In answer, the dissenting opinion in 
Jewell noted that a conscious purpose instruction must empha-
size that a defendant's subjective belief is the determinative fac-
tor.lUI Failure to emphasize this subjective belief may allow a 
ments or a conscious effort to avoid learning the truth). The court in Sarrantos, went 
one step further by stating "The phrases 'reckless disregard of whether the statements 
made were true' and 'conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth' mean essentially the 
same thing". See also, United States v. Abrams, 427 F.2d 86, 90-91 (2nd Cir.) (approving 
an instruction using "reckless disregard" for the truth) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970). 
108. United States v. Thomas, 484 F.2d 909, 912-914 (6th Cir.) (instruction included 
"reckless disregard" of truth or a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 912 (1973). 
109. United States v. Hanlon, 548 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2nd Cir. 1977) (conspiracy, wire 
fraud, making false statements to obtain loans; conscious avoidance charge approved, but 
use of "recklessness" disapproved). The court said, "The distinction between reckless-
ness and negligence is elusive enough for even the most respected scholars." [d. at 1101. 
110. [d. 
111. 548 F.2d 1096, 1100-02 (2nd Cir. 1977). 
112. [d. at 1101. The court said, "We are troubled ... by the repeated use of the 
term 'reckless' ". [d. There followed a discussion of the confusion generated by the term. 
Then the court said, "It adds nothing to the 'conscious avoidance' language which we 
have approved, and might tend to mislead the jury." [d. at 1101-02. Finally, while find-
ing that the jury instruction considered on appeal did not constitute error, the court 
cautioned that should trial courts continue to employ such language, "we will not hesi-
tate to take appropriate corrective measures". [d. 
113. See supra note 59 for the Ninth Circuit model. For examples of recent Second 
Circuit cases employing similar instructions, see United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 
1020-24 (2nd Cir.) (conspiracy to commit wire fraud), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861 (1986). 
See also, Unit.ed States v. Gatzonis, 805 F.2d 72, 73-74 (2nd Cir. 1986) (possession of 
heroin with intent to distribute), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 303 (1987). 
114. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "Want of knowledge ... may 
disprove the existence of a specific intent. Thus one cannot intend to steal property 
which he believes to be his own however careless he may have been in coming to that 
belief." [d. at 705 n.l (quoting R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 778 (2nd ed. 1969). 
115. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
16
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jury to convict on an objective theory of knowledge, that of a 
reasonable person.U6 In spite of a concerted effort to keep the 
standard one of a defendant's subjective knowledge, the reasona-
ble person standard has surfaced at least once in connection 
with the instruction.ll7 
In Jewell, the Ninth Circuit cautiously approved the district 
court's instruction as given,118 but recommended the instruction 
preferred by the court.U9 Subsequent decisions have insisted on 
the dual elements of the recommended instruction.120 That is, 
(l)the defendant must be aware of the high probability of the 
fact in question, (2)unless he actually believes it does not ex-
ist. 121 That framework remains viable and unique in its com-
[d. 
116. [d. Judge Kennedy, dissenting, said: 
The second defect in the instruction as given is that it did 
not alert the jury that Jewell could not be convicted if he "ac-
tually believed" there was no controlled substance in the car. 
The failure to emphasize, as does the Model Penal Code, that 
subjective belief is the determinative factor, may allow a jury 
to convict on an objective theory of knowledge-that a reasona-
ble man should have inspected the car and would have discov-
ered what was hidden inside. 
117. See United States v. Nicholson, 677 F.2d 706, 709-11 (9th Cir. 1982). Defend-
ant had invested $20,000 in a venture that was not disclosed to him. The court said, 
"The circumstances surrounding the investment opportunity presented to Nicholson 
would have put any reasonable person on notice that there was a 'high probability' that 
the undisclosed venture was illegal." [d. at 710. 
118. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
119. See supra note 59. 
120. See United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1977). The 
court reversed the conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana because 
the jury instruction failed include that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant was aware of a high probability that the vehicle he was driving con-
tained contraband. [d. Valle- Valdez was decided two and one-half years prior to Jewell 
and lacked the benefit of the recommended instruction. The district judge relied on a 
Tenth Circuit decision in Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d 845, 849 (10th Cir. 1962). 
Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d at 913. The Court found that because Valle-Valdez denied any 
knowledge or suspicion that he possessed contraband, a factual question arose regarding 
his awareness of the high probability of the presence of contraband. Reasoning that be-
cause this factual question should have gone to the jury, the effect of the instruction was 
to create the possibility that Valle-Valdez was convicted without possessing the contra-
band "knowingly" as interpreted in Jewell. [d. at 914. Because the error probably mate-
rially affected the verdict, the Ninth Circuit reversed. [d. at 917. See also United States 
v. Esquer-Gamez, 550 F.2d 1231, 1234-36 (9th Cir. 1977) (importing, possessing and dis-
tributing cocaine). The court reversed, in part, the conviction because the trial court's 
instruction failed to include the balancing element "unless he actually believes it does 
not exist". [d. at 1235. 
121. [d. 
17
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pleteness. The First Circuit only recently provided such guid-
ance.122 The Second Circuit continues to struggle with variations 
on the instruction. In a current attempt to settle the issue and 
promote uniformity, the court in United States v. Feroz,12S em-
phatically stated the preferred language and announced it would 
distribute copies of that opinion to the all of the United States 
Attorneys and the Assistant United States Attorneys within the 
Second Circuit to promote compliance.124 The Third Circuit has 
adopted the language of Jewell. 121i The Fifth Circuit, while citing 
Jewell with approval,I26 has been been silent on form, as has the 
Fourth Circuit127 and the Sixth Circuit.128 
The Seventh Circuit, adopting the sobriquet "ostrich in-
struction",129 and with substantial case law in support of the in-
struction,180 appears to be in the process of refining a preferred 
122. See United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 46-47 (1st Cir.) (wilful blindness 
instruction approved when (1) the defendant claims a lack of knowledge,(2)the facts sug-
gest a conscious course of deliberate ignorance, and (3)the instruction, taken as a whole, 
cannot be understood as mandating an inference of knowledge), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
847 (1986). 
123. 848 F.2d 359, 360-61 (2nd. Cir. 1988) (possession of heroin with intent to dis-
tribute). The court said: 
[d. 
124. [d. 
This court has repeatedly emphasized that, in giving the 
conscious avoidance charge, the district judge should instruct 
the jury that knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is 
established (1) if a person is aware of a high probability of its 
existence, (2) unless he actually believes that it does not exist. 
125. See United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365-66 (3rd Cir. 1985). 
126. United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 527-29 (5th Cir.) (importation 
and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978). 
The court acknowledged that the instruction given did not include balancing language 
(the second half of the dual element of Jewell), but concluded that the charge was not so 
deficient as to be plain error. [d. Later, in United States v. Batencort, 592 F.2d 916, 917-
18 (5th Cir. 1979), that court approved an instruction that did contain the dual elements, 
but made no mention of form. 
127. See United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 181 (4th Cir. 1988). 
128. See United States v. Thomas, 484 F.2d 909, 912-14 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 912 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 924 (1974). 
129. United States v. Holland, 831 F.2d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1987) (aiding and abetting 
misapplication of federally insured funds). See also United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 
184, 189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986). The court said, "When someone 
knows enough to put him on inquiry, he knows much. If a person with a lurking suspi-
cion goes on as before and avoids further knowledge, this may support an inference that 
he has deduced the truth and is simply trying to avoid giving the appearance (and incur-
ring the consequences) of knowledge." 
130. United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1896) (conspiracy to smuggle 
marijuana and cocaine); United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585 (7th Cir.) (conspiracy to 
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version.l31 Despite the urgings of the court, however, no defini-
tive model has emerged. ls2 Nor has a model instruction been 
suggested in the Eighth Circuit.133 The Tenth Circuit has recom-
mended an instruction similar in form to Jewell, but has not 
required compliance. IS. And finally, the Eleventh Circuit has ap-
proved instructions which vary considerably,m but has offered 
no preferred version. 
The result of these variations among the federal courts is an 
instruction that has achieved less than full utility. While widely 
approved, it remains misunderstood and misused with surprising 
frequency. 
possess and possession of stolen whiskey), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1055 (1985); United 
States v. Lynch, 699 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1982) (mail fraud and conspiracy to commit rack-
eteering). See also supra note 129. 
131. Ramsey, 785 F.2d at 190. The court noted that there is an "undercurrent of 
dissatisfaction with the instruction". [d. Finding the standard jury instruction somewhat 
opaque, the court noted that however useful the idea of inferring knowledge from stud-
ied ignorance may seem to judges, it is an unusual concept for a lay juror. Therefore, it is 
important to give them instructions that are reasonably comprehensible. [d. To this end, 
the court suggested the following instruction: 
[d. 
You may infer knowledge from a combination of suspicion 
and indifference to the truth. If you find that a person had a 
strong suspicion that things were not what they seemed or 
that someone had withheld some important facts, yet shut his 
eyes for fear of what he would learn, you may conclude that he 
acted knowingly, as I have used that word. 
132. Kehm, 799 F.2d at 362. Referring to the decision in Ramsey, the court ob-
served, "We have urged district judges to choose better language, but we have also held 
that this language is permissible". [d. 
133. See United States v. White, 794 F.2d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 1986) (conspiracy to 
steal and possess stolen mail, and possession of stolen mail); United States V. Nordstrom, 
730 F.2d 556, 557 (8th Cir. 1984) (aiding or assisting escape of a federal prisoner). 
134. See United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639, 643 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 
U.S. 1005 (1984). The defendant in Glick argued that the version of the instruction given 
at trial was inadequate because it failed to require the jury to find that "the defendant 
was subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact whose knowledge 
is imputed, and that knowledge of that fact may not be imputed if the defendant actu-
ally believed that such fact did not exist". [d. While finding that failure to include such 
language did not constitute grounds for reversal, the court did find that inclusion of the 
omitted language would have been preferable. [d. at 643-44. Similarly, in United States 
V. Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244, 249 (10th Cir. 1987), the court expressed a preference for the 
dual elements, but found that failure to include them did not warrant a reversal. [d. 
135. See United States V. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024, 1028 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 
S.Ct. 2003 (1988); United States V. Orr, 825 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 1987) (illegal 
salvage and sale of automobiles); United States V. Peddle, 821 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 
1987) (conspiracy to import and possess cocaine with intent to distribute); United State 
v. Aleman, 728 F.2d 492, 493-94 (11th Cir. 1984). 
19
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IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE MAJORITY 
The primary issue considered in the Alvarado appeal was 
the appropriateness of the district court's use of the Jewell in-
struction.13s Relying on established guidelines,137 the court reaf-
firmed that when the evidence points to actual knowledge, or 
lack of any knowledge, rather than deliberate avoidance, the giv-
ing of a Jewell instruction is inappropriate.13s The court ob-
served that the standard test remains an awareness by the de-
fendant of a high probability of the existence of the fact in 
question coupled with actions indicating that the defendant pur-
posely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to 
have a defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution.13B 
Thus, in order to correctly employ a conscious ignorance instruc-
tion, the government must have presented evidence supporting 
an inference that Alvarado and Oqueli purposely avoided ob-
taining actual knowledge that the suitcase contained cocaine.140 
Evidence indicating that they had actual knowledge or lacked 
any knowledge of the cocaine would render the instruction 
inappropriate. 141 
1. Gustavo Alvarado 
The prosecution contended that the evidence presented at 
trial "established a plethora of suspicious circumstances"142 
tending to show not only conscious avoidance of knowledge, but 
also evidence of a conspiracy to import cocaine which "could 
only have been unknown to the defendants because of deliber-
ate ignorance"I'3 (emphasis in the original). 
136. United States v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 314-16 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 
S.Ct. 2880 (1988). 
137. [d. at 314 (quoting United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d 
1096 (9th Cir. 1985)). "A Jewell instruction is properly given only when [the] defendant 
claims a lack of guilty knowledge and the proof at trial supports an inference of deliber-
ate ignorance." [d. at 1098. 
138. Alvarado, 838 F.2d at 314. 
139. [d. 
140. [d. 
141. [d. 
142. [d. at 315. 
143. [d. 
20
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The Ninth Circuit disagreed and concluded that most, if not 
all, the facts supported a finding of actual knowledge. l44 The 
prosecution relied, in part, on the evidence that Alvarado re-
trieved and carried Oqueli's suitcase rather than his own, that 
he had appeared nervous and trembling at the customs check, 
that he had made inconsistent statements regarding the purpose 
of his trip and that he had made inconsistent statements about 
the ownership of the black suitcase.141i The most persuasive ar-
144. [d. at 314-15. 
145. [d. at 315. The prosecution pointed to the following evidence: 
1. Alvarado and Oqueli were the last passengers off the plane 
and the last to pass through the prescreening and control 
points. The prosecution argued at trial that defendants were 
hoping that the customs inspectors would be less diligent. 
2. Alvarado retrieved and carried from the luggage carousel, 
not his luggage, but two suitcases belonging to codefendant 
Oqueli. 
3. Alvarado appeared nervous and trembling during his con-
tacts with customs officers. 
4. Alvarado had two airplane tickets, one of which he used to 
fly home on Varig Airlines and was paid for with cash, and a 
valid, but unused, Japanese Airline ticket. Alvarado testified 
that Oqueli gave him the Varig ticket. Oqueli denied giving 
the ticket to Alvarado. 
5. Alvarado made inconsistent statements to customs officials 
about the purpose of his trip. He told the inspector at 
prescreening that he was returning from Rio de Janeiro alone 
after a one-week vacation. After his arrest, he told DEA agents 
he had been on a ten-day trip to Rio for a medical conference. 
At trial, he testified that he went to Rio with Oquelito price 
leather for a contemplated import/export business. 
6. Alvarado appeared to avoid opening the black suitcase 
which contained the cocaine. After he was requested to obtain 
the keys to open the black suitcase, he presented keys that fit 
the brown suitcase, not the black one. He readily agreed to 
open the brown suitcase. 
7. Alvarado made inconsistent statements regarding the own-
ership of the black suitcase. At the secondary search area, he 
claimed ownership of both the black and brown suitcases and 
presented the appropriate baggage claim tags. He further 
stated that he had set the combination on the black when he 
purchased it. Later, when he was given a crowbar to force 
open the black suitcase, he stated that the suitcase was "Os-
car's", not his, and that he was not responsible for its 
contents. 
8. After forcing open the black suitcase with a crowbar, Alva-
rado immediately turned pale even though there was no co-
caine yet visible. 
9. Alvarado allegedly made a post-arrest statement that he 
agreed to carry the black suitcase as a favor for a friend and, 
upon his return to the United States, his friend would give 
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gument advanced by the prosecution was Alvarado's alleged 
post-arrest statement that a friend had promised him $5000 as a 
gift if he delivered the black suitcase.146 Because of the contra-
dictory nature of this evidence,147 the court concluded that this 
argument alone did not justify a Jewell instruction.1• 8 
2. Oscar Oqueli-Hernandez 
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the evidence 
presented at trial pointed to actual knowledge by Oqueli rather 
than deliberate avoidance.1.& The prosecution pointed to evi-
dence that Oqueli carried Alvarado's suitcase through customs, 
that he had used an invalid diplomatic passport, his abandon-
ment of Alvarado at the airport, and the curious events at the 
Marriot Hotel and the airport prior to his arrest.lllO Those facts 
Id. 
him $5,000 as a gift for carrying the suitcase. 
146. Id. 
147. See supra text accompanying nn. 31-33. 
148. Alvarado, 838 F.2d at 315-16. 
149. Id. at 316. 
150. Id. The prosecution relied on the following evidence: 
1. Oqueli carried, not his, but Alvarado's suitcases through 
customs. 
2. Oqueli used an invalid diplomatic passport to pass through 
customs. Oqueli had been General Consul to the United States 
from Honduras for one year, but his diplomatic pass had 
expired. 
3. Oqueli, along with his son, Yuri, and Katan, apparently 
abandoned Alvarado at the airport while Alvarado was being 
questioned and searched by customs. This was deemed by the 
prosecution to be suspicious because Alvarado and Oqueli 
were close friends. 
4. Oqueli failed to appear at the Marriott Hotel to retrieve his 
suitcases at Alvarado's request. However, Oqueli's sister ar-
rived at the hotel, asked for change, and without engaging him 
in any other conversation, left and made a phone call. The 
prosecution claimed the sister was sent to conduct counter-
surveillance on behalf of Oqueli. 
5. Oqueli's peculiar method of retrieving his suitcase. Oqueli 
arrived at the airport in a taxi. It passed by Alvarado. Alva-
rado waved. Oqueli did not acknowledge. Oqueli exited the 
cab a short distance from Alvarado, motioned for him to re-
main where he was, then walked to a nearby telephone booth 
and made a telephone call. A telephone near Alvarado began 
to ring. Alvarado did not answer it. Oqueli hung up and 
walked hurriedly toward Alvarado. He picked up the suitcases, 
motioned for Alvarado to follow and walked hurriedly away. 
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in tandem with the facts relating to Alvarado tended to establish 
a "consciousness of guilt".uu The Court found that in light of 
the insufficiency of evidence for a trier of fact to reasonably con-
clude that Oqueli contrived to avoid learning of the cocaine" the 
Jewell instruction should not have been given.m 
3. Harmless Error 
The court then analyzed the erroneous administration of 
the instruction against the guidelines of the harmless error doc-
trine. IIlS As a result of this analysis, the court concluded that the 
error did not affect the verdict.1II4 The majority, convinced that 
the defendants were traveling together, knew of the cocaine, and 
had joined in an attempt to import the cocaine without detec-
[d. 
151. [d. 
152. [d. 
When DEA agents attempted to stop Oqueli, he resisted. 
6. All of Alvarado's telephone calls attempting to set up a 
meeting to return the suitcases emphasized Alvarado's desire 
to relinquish the black suitcase to Oqueli. In one telephone 
call to Oqueli's son Yuri, Alvarado threatened to throw the 
black suitcase away unless Oqueli appeared. 
7. Oqueli, in his post-arrest statement, claimed ownership of 
the black suitcase, but said "he had loaned it to his friend 
before boarding the plane on a return trip". However, at trial 
he asserted the suitcase belonged to him and that its entire 
contents were his. 
153. Alvarado, 838 F.2d at 317. Applying the reasoning in United States v. Beckett, 
724 F.2d 855, 856 (9th Cir. 1984) (narcotics violation) in which that court found that 
evidence of overwhelming guilt, compelling a conviction, establishes the appropriateness 
of the application of the harmless error rule, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that such evi-
dence was present in Alvarado. Alvarado, 838 F.2d at 317. The court noted the analysis 
from United States v. Rea, 532 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 837 (1976). 
In Rea, the defendant was charged with illegally importing and possessing heroin with 
intent to distribute. [d. at 148. At trial, and during deliberation, the jury inquired 
whether the element of knowledge required a finding that the defendant knew she had 
heroin or merely a controlled substance. After the trial judge had repeated his instruc-
tions several times, the jury was satisfied that they understood. [d. at 148-49. Following 
conviction, the defendant appealed on the grounds of inadequate jury instructions. [d. at 
148. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the imperfect state of the instructions, but held 
that an improper instruction will be harmless error where the instruction is "logically 
harmless" to the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. [d. at 149. 
154. Alvarado, 838 F.2d at 317. The court further noted that it is mandatory to 
consider the entire record prior to reversing a conviction for such harmless error. [d. 
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (before a constitutional error can 
be held harmless, the court must be able to declare its belief that the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt). 
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tion, found that a guilty verdict on all counts was compelled. 11111 
B. CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT 
Judge Canby concurred with the majority opinion in all por-
tions relating to defendant Oqueli. Dissenting as to the result for 
Defendant Alvarado, he first acknowledged that the Jewell in-
struction is harmless error if the evidence is so overwhelming 
that a conviction is compelled. lIIs He could not agree that the 
evidence presented compelled a conviction of Alvarado. 1 117 
V. CRITIQUE 
In view of the acceptance by every circuit of some form of 
the conscious ignorance instruction,11l8 the Ninth Circuit's re-
newed approval of the concept in United States v. Alvaradol1l9 is 
certainly well within the mainstream of judicial reasoning. ISO 
The finding in Alvarado, that the Jewell instruction was inap-
propriately given in the presence of facts pointing toward actual 
knowledge rather than conscious avoidance, is consistent with 
previous Ninth Circuit decisions. lSI Nevertheless, the erroneous 
use of the instruction in Alvarado is typical of the difficulties 
courts have encountered in determining the context in which it 
may be applied. ls2 
Cases involving illegal contraband often present very similar 
fact patterns, as demonstrated in Alvarado, Suttiswad,ls3 and 
Feroz. lS• In all three cases, defendants were apprehended at air-
155. [d. 
156. [d. (Canby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.) 
157. [d. at 317-18. (Canby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.) 
158. United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 
1186 (1986). See also supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text. 
159. 838 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2880 (1988). 
160. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 702-03 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 
426 U.S. 951 (1976). The Jewell court noted that the lines of authority recognizing the 
concept of conscious ignorance appeared unbroken. [d. To reach a different result would 
put the court in direct conflict with those Courts of Appeals in other circuits that had 
approved conscious ignorance instructions. [d. 
161. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text. 
162. See supra notes 97-98, 100-01. 
163. United States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1982). See supra text accom-
panying notes 78 - 87 for discussion of facts. 
164. United States v. Feroz, 848 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1988). See also supra text ac-
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ports after illegal contraband was discovered in luggage carried 
by defendants. All denied knowledge of the presence of the the 
contraband. And in each case, the defendant claimed that the 
luggage had been given to him by another individual under pre-
text of friendship. In view of such significant similarities, leading 
to different results, it is not surprising that the fine line between 
facts tending to show actual knowledge and facts tending to 
show deliberate ignorance may be difficult to appreciate. 
Under the facts presented in Suttiswad, the Ninth Circuit 
found that the Jewell instruction was properly given.161i Assum-
ing that the "Mr. Tom" story was true/66 the circumstances sur-
rounding the defendant's trip to the United States sufficiently 
pointed to deliberate ignorance which would justify such an 
instruction.167 
The Second Circuit, in Feroz, while considering primarily 
the form of the instruction/6s affirmed that the conscious avoid-
ance charge is properly used "where a defendant has claimed 
lack of some specific aspect of knowledge necessary to conviction 
but where the evidence may be construed as deliberate 
ignorance. "169 
companying notes 88-93 for discussion of facts. 
165. [d. at 651. 
166. The validity of defendant's claim that he unknowingly acted as a "mule" was 
discussed at length during closing arguments. [d. at n.4. The court noted that the jury, in 
determining such validity, should consider the defendant's background, the inherent im-
probability of the "Mr. Tom story", the defendant's actions at the airport before he 
claimed his bag, his conflicting stories about where he was to meet "Mr. Tom", the vari-
ous descriptions he gave of his occupation, the suspicious nature of his possession of the 
15-day tour letter which conflicted with his story that he came to visit "Mr. Tom", and 
finally, whether or not an knowing "mule" would have been entrusted with heroin valued 
at $5,000,000. [d. 
167. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d at 651. The court observed that if a relative stranger, of 
short acquaintance, gave Suttiswad the airplane ticket, clothing, a substantial amount of 
cash, and a suitcase which seemed to be unusually heavy, and if Suttiswad was expected 
to travel to the United States to meet "Mr. Tom" without ever knowing his last name, 
his address or phone number, the jury could properly infer that defendant deliberately 
closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to him. [d. 
168. [d. at 360. The trial judge failed to include in his instruction that knowledge of 
the existence of a particular fact is established (1) if a person is aware of a high 
probability of its existence, (2) unless he believes that it does not exist. [d. (citing United 
States v. Shareef, 714 F.2d 232, 233 (2nd. Cir. 1983)). 
169. [d. (citing United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1022 (2nd. Cir.), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 861 (1986)). 
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The task of ascertaining the factual situation appropriate 
for application of a Jewell instruction is complicated further 
when courts, as in Suttiswad, acknowledge the "inherent im-
probability"170 of defendant's story and yet find the same cir-
cumstances sufficient to show deliberate ignorance. 
Inconsistency and confusion over form has presented the 
second major difficulty in the application of a conscious igno-
rance instruction.171 While the form of the instruction given in 
Alvarado was not addressed by the court, it is possible to specu-
late that it would not have passed muster under Jewell and sub-
sequent Ninth Circuit standards.17:1 The requesite dual elements 
of "high probability of awareness by defendant" and a negation 
by defendants' own belief were lacking. The failure of the trial 
court to use the established language is puzzling in light of the 
wealth of case law that has emerged since Jewell. As the court in 
Ramsey noted, federal courts should be able to do better than 
continuously repeat an instruction that is opaque and unhelpful 
to jurors.173 There are goals higher than seeing "not reversible 
error" in an appellate opinion.174 The Ninth Circuit's model in-
struction, its dual elements suggested in Jewell and patterned 
after the Model Penal Code's definition of knowledge, has 
proved to be complete and has required no modification. Even 
so, as demonstrated in Alvarado, courts within the Ninth Circuit 
remain subject to error in form. 
Still less consistency has been noted in the circuits where no 
standard form of the instruction has been adopted. l7Ii However, 
certain patterns have emerged to indicate that there is at least 
some consensus as to minimal acceptable form.176 Judge Gurfein, 
170. See supra note 166. 
171. See supra text accompanying notes 118-35. 
172. See supra note 39. 
173. Ramsey, 785 F.2d at 190. The court noted that most jurors encounter the "ar-
cane language" of instructions infrequently. [d. Therefore it is important to give them 
instructions that do not require scholastic glossators to impart meaning. [d. 
174. [d. 
175. See supra notes 122-35 and accompanying text. 
176. See supra note 103. In United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 46-47 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 847 (1986), the First Circuit adopted the first two require-
ments of the Ninth Circuit that (1) the defendant must claim a lack of guilty knowledge 
and (2) that the facts must suggest a course of deliberate ignorance. The third require-
ment suggested by that court is that the instructions taken as a whole must not be un-
derstood as mandating an inference of knowledge. [d. This universal concept was articu-
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writing the opinion of the court for the Second Circuit in United 
States v. Bright,177 noted that although some may say, quite 
properly, that subtle nuances in a judge's charge fall on deaf 
ears, there is no assurance that this is SO.178 The juror's difficult 
task of probing the mind and will of the defendant is hard 
enough with the aid of an instruction that balances the counter-
vailing considerations.179 That juror's verdict becomes suspect 
when he has not had the benefit of a balanced instruction from 
the court.180 While use of the balancing language of Section 
2.02(7) of the Model Penal Code has not been universally 
adopted, research has failed to produce a single instance where 
inclusion of such language has produced an instruction disap-
proved on the basis of form. 
lated by Judge Duniway, writing for the majority in United States v. Murrieta-Bejarano, 
552 F.2d 1323, 1324-25 (9th Cir. 1977). Anticipating that, under certain circumstances, 
the act of giving the instruction might be to create a presumption of guilt, he wrote, 
"Although no evidence indicates a defendant's conscious purpose to avoid learning the 
truth, a jury, given the Jewell instruction, might infer that the defendant possessed 
"knowledge" when it would not otherwise have done so." Id. at 1325. 
177. 517 F.2d 584, 587 (9th Cir. 1975). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. The court noted Section 2.02(7) of the Model Penal Code and its coupling 
of the element of "high probability" with its negation by a defendant's actual belief to 
the contrary. Id. See also supra note 59. See also United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 
361, 365-66 (3rd Cir. 1985) (adopting the language of Jewell). See also supra note 169. 
The Fifth Circuit cited the Model Penal Code definition of knowledge with approval in 
United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
935 (1978), although approving an instruction that lacked the balancing language. Id. at 
529. But see United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 1986). The court, while 
noting the ongoing dissatisfaction with the language adopted by trial courts, approved an 
instruction that did not include balancing language. Nevertheless, the court noted that 
the facts suggested a "high probability of awareness" by the defendant of the fact in 
question. Id. See also United States v. Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1987). The Tenth 
Circuit acknowledged that the preferred form of the instruction includes balancing lan-
guage, but concluded that, in the context of the entire record, failure to include the 
language did not warrant reversal. Id. at 249. See also United States v. Peddle, 821 F.2d 
1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1987). In Peddle, the Eleventh Circuit approved a charge that in-
corporated balancing language. But see United States v. Orr, 825 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 
1987). The court in Orr approved the following instruction: 
[d. at 1541. 
[T]he element of knowledge may be satisfied by infer-
ences drawn from proof that a defendant deliberately closed 
his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him. A 
finding beyond reasonable doubt of a conscious purpose to 
avoid enlightenment would permit an inference of knowledge. 
Stated another way, a defendant's knowledge of a fact may be 
inferred from willful blindness to the existence of the fact. 
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The current political and social preoccupation with illegal 
drug importation gives renewed relevance to a conscious igno-
rance or Jewell instruction as a prosecutorial tool. As the Ninth 
Circuit noted in United States v. Nicholson,18l absent the in-
struction, it would be impossible to obtain conspiracy convic-
tions in many instances, and the "money men" financing drug 
importation and distribution would escape liability simply by 
electing not to know the true nature of the venture in which 
they are participating.182 For these reasons, and because the im-
pact of the instruction is diluted by misuse, it is incumbant on 
the federal Courts of Appeal to give clear and consistent guid-
ance on form and context. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Deliberate ignorance instructions are alive and well in the 
federal Courts of Appeal. "See no evil" is not a maxim in which 
the criminal defendant may take comfort.18S The Ninth Circuit 
has provided a model that remains preeminent in its clarity and 
completeness and the Jewell instruction on deliberate ignorance 
remains the standard against which all others may be compared. 
Nevertheless, confusion and misuse of the instruction continue 
to diminish its effectiveness in criminal prosecutions. 
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